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ANALYSIS: Double-speak —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

The two stands of American policy, i.e. unilateralism and working with others, are being pursued simultaneously as well as separately, causing contradictions at the operational level

Sandwiched between the American air and ground attacks in the tribal areas and domestic pressure to respond firmly to these attacks, the Government of Pakistan faced a difficult diplomatic situation last week.

The attacks, taking place within a week of COAS Gen Ashfaq Kayani’s meeting with the American top brass, created the impression that they may have Gen Kayani’s tacit approval. So the Pakistan Army also felt the heat of public opinion. The COAS dispelled this impression by issuing a statement that rejected the attacks and asserted Pakistan’s right to look after its internal security.

The current tension in Pak-US relations was defused by the visit to Islamabad of Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. On September 17, he reiterated US “commitment to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty”.

Within hours of Adm Mullen’s departure from Islamabad, an Afghanistan-based US drone launched a new missile attack in North Waziristan, killing six people. This gave rise to yet another controversy in Pakistan about the divergence between Adm Mullen’s statement and the actions of US military authorities in Afghanistan.

US statements from civilian and military officials regarding Pakistan often contradict each other. The typical pattern is that an American official defends military operations in the tribal areas but at the same time talks of respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty, maintaining that the US wants to work with Pakistan on countering terrorism.

Statements by US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates and Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte provide ample evidence of attempts to pacify Pakistan while not giving any definite assurance of non-intervention. The White House spokesperson also continues to engage in double-talk. Most view these statements as contradictory and meant only to placate angry Pakistanis, at least till the next attack.

The Bush administration continues to hold on to its unilateral and pre-emptive counterterrorism strategy, arrogating to itself the right to take military action anytime, anywhere. President Bush re-emphasised this policy in July when he authorised unilateral action in the tribal areas if and when needed.

Another strand of counter-terrorism policy emphasises working in partnership with others. This principle reinvigorated Pakistan-US relations after September 2001. This perspective is reflected in John Negroponte’s statement in September 2008 that unilateral actions cannot defeat militancy in the tribal areas.

These two stands of American policy, i.e. unilateralism and working with others, are being pursued simultaneously as well as separately, causing ambiguities and contradictions at the operational level. Admiral Mullen’s visit was meant to avoid Pakistan boiling over rather than to give any categorical commitment that the US would no longer take unilateral military action in the tribal areas.

This is a hazardous course of action. The American policy of launching military operations in the tribal areas and pacifying Pakistan subsequently by friendly statements and economic assistance may not always work. It can be counter-productive to evolving long term solutions to extremism and terrorism in and around Pakistan.

Unilateral US military actions in the tribal areas have four negative implications for counter-terrorism.

First, these actions undermine the credibility of the elected civilian government in Pakistan and compromise its efforts to effectively manage the troubled political and economic situation. If these attacks continue, the elected civilian government will find it difficult to carve out its identity as an efficacious machine after long years of military authoritarian rule. The Pakistan government will be bogged down in controversies regarding the most effective ways to protect Pakistan’s sovereignty. This will divert its attention from domestic economic and political problems which need urgent attention if it wants to hold on to power with popular backing. Any governmental crisis and internal disorder in Pakistan cannot serve the long-term US agenda on countering terrorism.

Second, the military also faces pressure to adopt adequate measures to secure Pakistani territory against foreign attacks. This pressure is mounted not only by civilians but also by military circles that feel perturbed by these attacks. This also has implications for civil-military relations. If the military comes to the conclusion that the civilian government is not able to adopt effective diplomatic measures, it may either mount pressure to push the government to action, change civilian leaders in power, or completely displace the civilian government. Therefore, if the US steps up its military activities in the tribal areas, Pakistan’s civilian leaders may lose the political initiative to the military.

Third, US attacks have provided a convenient excuse to Islamist parties and militant groups to engage in popular mobilisation. Major religious parties had suffered an electoral setback in the February 2008 elections, which had forced them to adopt a low-key posture. Now, with increasing American attacks, these groups are cashing in on growing anti-America sentiments. Some are staging protest marches and meetings and using Friday sermons to mobilise people against Pakistan’s participation in the global war on terrorism. They describe the elected civilian government as a lackey of the US that is unable to respond courageously to American “aggression”. Most of them want the Pakistan government to adopt some punitive measures against the US and militarily challenge American intrusions in Pakistani territory.

Fourth, the federal and NWFP governments are now openly supporting military action against violent elements in the tribal areas. If American attacks continue they will not be in a position to maintain their supportive posture. This will also weaken the commitment of paramilitary forces and army personnel to fight the insurgents. The Islamic activists are already asking Pakistani security personnel to fight American intruders rather than kill their fellow citizens.

The American policy of continuous intrusions in the tribal areas may help them to make some short-term gains in the context of the presidential elections. However, this policy cannot provide a durable solution to terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It undercuts the effort to win over the people for counter-terrorism operations.

American action constitutes a formidable diplomatic challenge to Pakistan’s internal coherence and stability and threatens Pakistan’s current transition to democracy. Given the dangerous implications of American action, the matter should be taken up with the US at the highest level.

President Asif Ali Zardari or Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani should take up this matter with the White House. They need to make it clear to President Bush and his close associates that the latter need to pursue a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to counter-terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Unilateral military action by the US is expected to accentuate Pakistan’s internal problems rather than control terrorism. The pre-requisites for a successful fight against terrorism in South Asia are internal coherence and participatory governance in Pakistan. The current American policy hardly recognises the importance to their counter-terrorism efforts of an internally coherent and democratic Pakistan.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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